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Collective Security, ‘Threats to the Peace’, and the Ebola Outbreak 
Gary Wilson 
 
ABSTRACT 
During mid-2014, the international community was rocked by the unprecedented spread of 
the Ebola virus. Having first taken hold in a number of West African states, the virus began 
to appear outside of the region as potentially catastrophic consequences were forecast by 
health experts, international organisations, politicians, and media outlets alike. In September, 
the UN Security Council labelled Ebola a ‘threat to the peace’ and the international 
community was urged to provide aid to the worse effected areas in order to eradicate its 
threat. This paper considers the nature of the Ebola outbreak as a ‘threat to the peace’ under 
the UN Charter’s collective security framework and attempts to place it within the wider 
context of discourse on the concept of collective security, in particular its human security 
dimension. Importantly, it will demonstrate the relationship between a threat of this kind and 
other recognised threats to the peace. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ebola virus came to international attention during spring 2014 as numerous cases were 
increasingly reported in Guinea-Bissau, 1 Liberia,2 and Sierra Leone.3 The unprecedented 
spread of the virus led to the United Nations Security Council declaring it to constitute a 
                                                          
 Phd, LLB (Hons.), Senior Lecturer in Law, Liverpool John Moores University. 
1 The outbreak was first reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO) by Guinea’s Ministry of Health on 
23 March 2014. See the WHO’s press release, available at http://www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-
programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-and-response/outbreak-news/4063-ebola-hemorrhagic-fever-in-
guinea.html 
2 See WHO press release of 30 March 2014, available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_03_30_ebola_lbr/en/  
3 See WHO press release of 1 April 2014, available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_04_01_ebola/en/  
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threat to the peace,4 amid a series of calls for the international community to provide robust 
aid in support of medical and humanitarian relief efforts.5 By October 2014, the virus had 
been contracted by individuals in the US and Spain.6 Globally, at this point, over 9,000 cases 
had been reported of Ebola and approximately 4,500 people had died from it.7 As of mid-
January 2015, the WHO had recorded 21,724 cases of infection, resulting in 8,641 deaths.8 
Liberia was declared Ebola free on 9 May 2015.9 
 
This paper seeks to enhance understanding of the nature of the Ebola outbreak as a threat to 
the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter, by exploring the relationship 
between the Ebola outbreak and other established threats to the peace, as well as placing it 
within the wider conceptual context of discourse upon the nature and scope of collective 
security. We begin by briefly outlining the concept of collective security and its 
implementation within the UN Charter framework, before proceeding to consider how 
collective security within the practice of the UN Security Council has increasingly come to 
incorporate ideas of human security through the range of situations which it has determined 
to constitute threats to the peace. The major part of the paper is then given to considering the 
nature of the Ebola outbreak and its conceptualisation as a threat to the peace. This involves 
                                                          
4 SC Res 2177 (2014). 
5 See, eg., Secretary-General’s remarks at High-level Event on Ebola, 25 September 2014, available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8050 ; Secretary-General’s Remarks on the Ebola Epidemic, 9 
October 2014, available at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8088  
6 See statements by the World Health Organization, of 1 October 2014 and 9 October 2014, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/01-october-2014-ebola/en/ and http://www.who.int/csr/don/09-october-2014-
ebola/en/  
7 As of 22 October 2014, there had been 9911 reported cases of infection and 4868 deaths. See WHO, Ebola 
Response Roadmap Situation Report, 22 October 2014, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/situation-reports/en/  
8 Ebola Situation report, available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/situation-reports/en/  The worse 
affected states remained Sierra Leone (10,340 cases; 3145 deaths), Liberia (8,478 cases; 3,605 deaths) and 
Guinea(2,871 cases; 1,876 deaths). Relatively isolated cases had also been recorded in Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, 
Spain, the US and the UK. 
9 WHO statement, ‘The Ebola outbreak in Liberia is over’, 9 May 2015, available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/liberia-ends-ebola/en/  
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exploration of the characteristics which make the Ebola outbreak such a threat, its 
relationship with other threats to the peace, and the extent to which it represents a threat of 
the kind for which the traditional techniques of the UN collective security system are suitable 
for responding to it. 
 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE UN CHARTER SYSTEM, AND ‘THREATS TO THE 
PEACE’ 
 
The term ‘collective security’ implies an arrangement by which states act collectively to 
guarantee one another’s security. Resting upon the idea of the ‘indivisibility of peace’,10 the 
notion that the peace of all states is inextricably tied to that of all others, in an ideal collective 
security system each state “accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to 
join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace.”11 The scope of what are 
considered to pose security threats within any system of collective security will ultimately 
depend upon that system’s conceptualisation of the notion of security. Similarly, the 
mechanisms available for addressing such threats will be dependent upon the provisions of 
the collective security system in question. Historically, collective security was largely 
deemed to concern the protection of states from external attack. As the Commission on 
Global Governance has noted, “Since the seventeenth century, international security has been 
defined almost entirely in terms of national survival needs. Security has meant the protection 
of the state…from external attack.”12 This traditional view of collective security regarded it 
as an agreement among states that they would regard external aggression against one of their 
number as an act against them all, and that they would respond with a collective use of force 
                                                          
10 Claude, I.L., Swords Into Plowshares (4th ed.) (New York: McGraw Hill, 1984), pp.229-232. 
11 Roberts, A & Zaum, D., Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945 
(London: Routledge, 2008), p.11. 
12 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford & New York: OUP, 1995), p.78. 
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against the perpetrators of such aggression. This definition of collective security prevailed in 
most earlier theoretical discussions of the concept.13 Arguably, such an understanding of 
collective security was reflected within the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10 of 
which provided that, “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League.” The Covenant made no express reference to other possible forms of 
security threats.  
 
However, collective security can no longer be viewed simply in terms of an arrangement 
among states to collectively respond to acts of external aggression. Such an understanding is 
too narrow and fails to recognise the potentially broader nature of collective security, 
especially in light of its practice within the United Nations era. A flexible approach to 
collective security is found within the provisions of the UN Charter.  The Charter envisages a 
concert-based system of collective security,14 in which the major international powers take on 
special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security through their 
permanent membership of the executive-styled Security Council, endowed with robust 
powers to tackle situations of international concern. Central to the operation of the UN 
collective security system is the employment of Article 39, labelled the ‘gateway 
provision’,15 which enables the Security Council to “determine the existence of a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Significantly, there is no requirement of an 
armed attack or even a military threat for a situation to attract the Council’s attention. Nor 
must there be a dispute or conflict between or within states, creating the potential for a 
                                                          
13 See, eg., Claude, I.L., Swords into Plowshares (3rd ed.) (London: University of London Press, 1964), p.224; 
Johnson, H.C & Niemeyer, G., ‘Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal’, International Organization, 
1954, v.8, pp.19-35, at p.20; Kupchan, C.A & Kupchan, C.A., ‘Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of 
Europe’, International Security, 1991, v.16, n.1, pp.114-161, at p.118. 
14 On the nature of concert-based collective security, see, eg., Kupchan & Kupchan, ibid. 
15 White, N.D., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security (2nd ed.) (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.273. 
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flexible and broad application of the collective security concept. Following a determination 
under Article 39, the Council may respond to a situation of concern by authorising sanctions 
of a non-military16 or military nature.17 The key term contained in Article 39 is that of ‘threat 
to the peace’, the other two labels contained therein having been seldom used in the practice 
of the Council.18 The flexible language used allows for the implementation of a form of 
collective security which goes beyond simply responding to external aggression, Shraga 
having noted correctly that “more than six decades after the adoption of the UN Charter, the 
concept of ‘peace’ and of what constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ has fundamentally 
changed.”19 As one study has asserted, in the post-Cold War era “Global security was 
redefined…and the tasks undertaken to provide security widened to protecting civilians from 
massacre by their own governments as well as shoring up weak states threatened by struggles 
among factional militias.”20 Indeed, in the Post-Cold War era the Security Council has 
identified threats to international peace and security emanating from a range of situations 
including human rights abuses, the humanitarian consequences of internal armed conflict, the 
removal of democratically elected governments, and international terrorism.21 
 
Importantly, the UN Charter system provides for a range of responses to collective security 
threats. As noted, the Charter links determinations of threats to the peace under Article 39 
with non-military and military sanctions under Articles 41 and 42, but the UN Security 
                                                          
16 Article 41. 
17 Article 42. 
18 The term ‘act of aggression’ is not used by the Council, and ‘breach of the peace’ has only been attached to 
four situations, all involving the existence of inter-state conflict: North Korea’s invasion of the Republic of 
Korea (SC Res 82 (1950)); the Iran-Iraq War (SC Res 598 (1987)); Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands 
(SC Res 502 (1982)); and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (SC Res 660 (1990)). For further discussion, see Frowein, 
J.A & Krisch, N., ‘Article 39’, in Simma, B et al (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp.717-729. 
19 Shraga, D., ‘The Security Council and Human Rights – From Discretion to Promote to Obligation to Protect’, 
in Fassbender, B (ed.), Securing Human Rights? (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp.8-35, at p.12. See in general 
MacFarlane, S.N., ‘Human Security and the Law of States’, in Goold, B.J & Lazarus, L (eds.), Security and 
Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp.347-361. 
20 Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O & Aall, P., ‘Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace 
and security cooperation?’, International Affairs, 2011, v.87, n.1, pp.39-58, at p.42. 
21 See further below. 
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Council has also utilised the tools of diplomacy and peacekeeping to address perceived 
security threats.22 
 
 
HUMAN SECURITY AS COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
 
Acting under Article 39 the Security Council enjoys considerable discretion in classifying 
situations as threats to the peace, being subject to relatively little legal regulation. The 
Council’s decisions are essentially political in nature and it is only in extreme cases that a 
decision to determine that a threat to the peace exists would be considered to be ultra vires 
the Council’s powers.23 
 
Increasingly, the Security Council has displayed an approach to the discharge of its collective 
security functions which go beyond statist conceptions of collective security to bring within 
its purview situations and phenomena which threaten human well-being on a wide range of 
levels. As one commentator has observed, “the policy debate has moved beyond the 
traditional State-centric security paradigms, particularly with the emergence of human 
security.”24 The concept of human security, in turn, has been defined as “a human or people 
centred and multi-sectoral approach to security, which entails the protection of people from 
critical and pervasive threats and situations.”25 It involves “safety from chronic threats such 
as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
                                                          
22 See generally Wilson, G., The United Nations and Collective Security (London: Routledge, 2014), chs.4 & 6. 
23 On the legal regulation of the Security Council’s chapter VII powers, see Wilson, G., ‘The Legal, Military and 
Political Consequences of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action’, Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law, 2007, v.12, n.2, pp.295-330, at pp.298-301. 
24 Nasu, H., ‘The Place of Human Security in Collective Security’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2013, 
v.18, n.1, pp.95-129, at p.95. 
25 Final Report of the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (2003), available at 
http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/finalreport/index.html  
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patterns of daily life.”26 First meaningfully advanced in the 1994 Human Development 
Report,27 this approach has come to feature in a number of important UN documents since the 
beginning of the new millennium. Building upon the objectives set out in the UN’s 
Millennium Declaration,28 the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change stressed the importance of adopting a ‘comprehensive’ conception of collective 
security.29 It noted particularly that in the modern world security threats are inter-related,30 
and that their nature is such that no state alone can make itself invulnerable.31 It is also worth 
noting the simultaneous development of the responsibility to protect doctrine,32 under which 
states have the primary responsibility to protect their civilian populations from harm, but 
which gives rise to a secondary responsibility on the part of the international community to 
intervene where a state is unable or unwilling to meet its obligation to protect its people. The 
doctrine received the support of the UN General Assembly at the 2005 world summit,33 
evidencing further the extent to which contemporary conceptions of security have human 
security at their core, and the Secretary-General has issued a series of reports to promote 
understanding and cooperation in relation to the concept’s development and 
implementation.34 Undoubtedly, there is a clear trend towards a human security centred 
approach to collective security. 
 
                                                          
26 UNDP, Human Development Report: new dimensions of human security (Oxford & New York: OUP, 1994), 
p.14. The report breaks down threats to human security into seven components: economic, food, health, 
environmental, personal, community and political (pp.22-25). See Martin, M & Owen, T., ‘The second 
generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience’, International Affairs, 2010, v.86, n.1, 
pp.211-224, at pp.212-216. 
 
27 Ibid. For discussion, see Frerks, G., ‘Human Security as a discourse and counter-discourse’, Security & 
Human Rights, 2008, n.1, pp.8-14. 
28 GA Res 55/L.2.  
29 UN Doc. A/59/565, Pt.II. 
30 Ibid, para.17. 
31 Supra n29, para.24. 
32 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf  
33 UN GA Res.60/1, paras.138-40. 
34 See, eg., UN Docs. A/64/701; A/66/703; A/68/685. 
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Beyond the UN context, regional bodies have also evidenced a broadened conception of what 
will amount to security threats. For example, the OSCE was one of the first bodies to employ 
a broad conception of security threats centred on human security,35 and in its 2003 European 
security strategy the EU makes reference to the emergence of new security threats including 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure and organised 
crime.36 NATO’s 2010 strategic concept also recognises the existence of a diverse range of 
security threats.37 
 
The activity of the UN Security Council in recent years has seen it give significant 
consideration to matters with a human security dimension.38 The protection of civilians and 
humanitarian relief supplies during armed conflict has been a major source of concern and a 
number of UN peacekeeping operations,39 as well as military enforcement operations,40 have 
been tasked with mandates which include responsibility for the protection of civilians.41 One 
of the most prominent such operations was the NATO action in Libya during the 2011 civil 
war, tasked with protecting civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.42 The 
                                                          
35 Odello, M., ‘The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Security Law’, in 
Trybus, M & White, N.D., European Security Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp.295-328, at p.297, 313-15. 
36 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels: EU, 2003). 
37 Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted at Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, available at 
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf  
38 See, in general, Nasu, supra n24. 
39 See, eg., the mandates conferred upon peacekeeping operations deployed to Sierra Leone (SC Res 1270 
(1999)), the DRC (SC Res 1291 (2000)), Cote d’Ivoire (SC Res 1528 (2004)), Burundi (SC Res 1545 (2004)), 
Sudan (SC Res 1590 (2005)), Darfur (SC Res 1769 (2007)), Abeyi (SC Res 1990 (2011)), and South Sudan (SC 
Res 1996 (2011)). 
40 See, eg., the mandates conferred upon operations taking action in respect of the situations existing in former 
Yugoslavia (SC Res 770 (1992)); SC Res 816 (1993)); SC Res 836 (1993)), Somalia (SC Re 794 (1992)), 
Rwanda (SC Res 929 (1994)), Zaire (SC Res 1080 (1996)), Albania (SC Res 1101 (1997)), East Timor (SC Res 
1264 (1999)), Cote d’Ivoire (SC Res 1464 (2003)), the DRC (SC Res 1484 (2003)), Chad & the Central African 
Republic (SC Res 1778 (2007)), Libya (SC Res 1973 (2011)), and Mali (SC Res 2085 (2012)). 
41 For general discussion, see Breau, S., ‘The impact of the responsibility to protect on peacekeeping’, Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law, 2006, v.11, pp.429-464; Holt, V., Taylor, G & Kelly, M., Protecting Civilians in 
the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (New York: 
United Nations, 2009). 
42 SC Res 1973 (2011), para.4. For detailed discussion, see Wilson, G., ‘The United Nations Security Council, 
Libya and Resolution 1973: Protection of Civilians or Tool for Regime Change?’, in Panara, C & Wilson, G 
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Council has also sought to modify its approach towards the imposition of non-military 
sanctions in order to minimise their negative humanitarian effects.43 Considerable discussion 
within the Council has also centred upon such issues as the impact of HIV/Aids on the 
maintenance of international peace and security,44 food crises,45 and energy and climate 
change,46 the former two issues being clearly related to the conceptualisation of the Ebola 
outbreak as a threat to international peace and security. Like HIV/Aids, the spread of Ebola 
constitutes a major public health crisis, and one of its key effects identified by the Security 
Council was its impact upon the availability of food within the affected regions.47 
 
THE EBOLA OUTBREAK AS A ‘THREAT TO THE PEACE’ 
 
The nature of the outbreak 
 
The Ebola virus is highly contagious and once contracted, unless treated rapidly, results in 
relatively quick death.48 It was first identified in1976 in what is now the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo,49and although outbreaks have been reported in small numbers since then,50 the 
2014 outbreak in West Africa is by far the worst known.51 The first case during 2014 was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(eds.), The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law (Leiden & Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2013), pp.101-121. 
43 See Wilson, supra n22, pp.107-114. 
44 See UN Docs. S/PV. 4087 (of 2000), 4172 (of 2000), 4259 (of 2001), 4339 (of 2001), 4859 (of 2003), and 
528 (of 2005). See also SC Res 1308 (2000) 
45 See UN Docs. SPV. 4652 (of 2002), 4736 (of 2003), and 5220 (of 2005). 
46 See UN Doc. S/PV. 5663 (of 2007). 
47 See below. 
48 For a brief discussion of the virus, see Peters, C.J & LeDue, J.W., ‘An Introduction to Ebola: The Virus and 
the Disease’, Journal of Infectious Diseases, 1999, v.179, p.ix-xvi. 
49 See Peters & LeDue, ibid, p.ix. 
50 In the DRC during 1977, Sudan in 1979, and in the Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC and Gabon during 1994-6. See 
Peters & LeDue, supra n48, pp.ix-x. 
51 Baker, A., ‘Racing Ebola: What the world needs to do to stop the deadly virus’, Time Magazine, 13 October 
2014, pp.24-31, at p.26. 
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reported to the World Health Organisation in March and occurred in Guinea,52 before rapidly 
taking hold in Liberia53 and Sierra Leone.54 Notwithstanding a small number of cases 
identified in Nigeria, as well as isolated incidents in the US, UK, Mali, Senegal and Spain, 
the international response has centred upon Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where the 
overwhelming number of cases have arisen.55 
 
Conceptualising the threat posed by the Ebola outbreak 
 
At its meeting on 18 September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2177. In 
“determining that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security,”56 the Council elaborated further upon its 
perception of the nature of the Ebola threat by “recognizing that the peacebuilding and 
development gains of the most affected countries concerned could be reversed in light of the 
Ebola outbreak and underlining that the outbreak is undermining the stability of the most 
affected countries concerned and, unless contained, may lead to further instances of civil 
unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the political and security climate…” The “threat 
to the peace” posed by the Ebola outbreak was clearly understood in broad terms, which 
                                                          
52 WHO, supra n1. 
53 See supra n2. 
54 See supra n3. 
55 See supra n8 and accompanying text. 
56 Although sponsored by a record 130 states, note the comments of Colombia, casting doubt upon the nature of 
the Ebola outbreak as a threat to the peace: “while the Ebola outbreak in West Africa has the potential to erode 
stability and social cohesion in some of the countries concerned the situation cannot be characterized as a threat 
to international peace and security in general” (UN Doc. S/PV.7368, at p.45). It should be highlighted, however, 
that these sentiments were not reflected in the comments of the representatives of the overwhelming majority of 
states. 
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extended beyond its immediate effects on infected individuals to potential longer term 
consequences upon wider society more generally. 
From the discussion which took place between the members of the Council on 18 September 
and during subsequent meetings, taken together with other statements made by prominent 
international figures and bodies, it is possible to identify a shared understanding of the nature 
of the Ebola outbreak as a threat to international peace and security, which places emphasis 
upon a number of inter-related factors in classifying it in such terms. These concern 
respectively the complexity of the situation; the economic consequences of the outbreak; the 
associated issues of health, food and human security; the spill-over effects of the immediate 
consequences of the outbreak; the collective nature of both the threat posed by the Ebola 
outbreak and the response required to address it; and the effects on peacebuilding in the post-
conflict societies affected by the outbreak.57 We shall explore further each of these six factors 
within the wider context of conceptual understandings of collective security. 
 
The complexity of the threat 
As noted earlier, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change advocated a 
“comprehensive” approach to collective security. It recognised the diverse range of modern 
threats and their interrelated nature, and significantly, among the clusters of threats which it 
identified were “Economic and social effects, including…infectious diseases.”58 The complex 
nature of many modern threats to the peace was implicitly acknowledged in the panel’s 
                                                          
57 These six considerations are identified through a reading of the relevant UN and other international 
documents in which the nature of the Ebola outbreak is considered. It is, of course, possible to classify the key 
considerations highlighted by the international community into more or fewer groups dependent upon the 
approach taken. 
58 High-level Panel Report, supra n29, para.12. 
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report, it noting that often “threats are interrelated”59 and that “every threat to international 
security today enlarges the risk of other threats.”60  
Although not much consideration was given to the potentially comprehensive nature of 
collective security at the outset of the UN era, the Security Council has employed a 
comprehensive approach to collective security in determining the existence of threats to the 
peace under its more recent resolutions. However, the pronouncements of the international 
community on the Ebola outbreak have arguably been particularly robust in the forthright 
acknowledgment of the complexity of the situation to have arisen as a result. The Security 
Council in resolution 2177 noted the “wider political, security, socioeconomic and 
humanitarian dimension of the Ebola outbreak.”61 Essentially, the threat to the peace 
identified is not simply attributable to one cause (the Ebola outbreak per se) or a single 
consequence of an event (the resulting human suffering and loss of life). As will become 
apparent, it arises from a number of consequences of the Ebola outbreak which must also be 
understood within the context of the dynamics of the affected societies.62 Echoing the 
pronouncements of the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that, 
“The Ebola crisis has evolved into a complex emergency with significant political, social, 
economic, humanitarian and security dimensions.”63 Similarly, the director-general of the 
World Health Organization remarked, “This is not just an outbreak; this is not just a public 
health crisis. This is a social crisis, a humanitarian crisis, an economic crisis and a threat to 
national security well beyond the outbreak zones.”64 During the debate leading to the 
adoption of resolution 2177,65 and that taking place at a later meeting,66 a number of states 
                                                          
59 High-level Panel Report, supra n29, para.17. 
60 High-level Panel Report, supra n29, para.20. 
61 Para.2. 
62 See further below, for example, on the effects of post-conflict peacebuilding. 
63 UN Doc. S/PV.7268, at p.2. 
64 S/PV.7268, at p.5. 
65 S/PV.7268. 
66 UN Doc. S/PV.7318. 
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also commented upon the complex nature of the Ebola threat. For the most part observations 
reflected upon its complexity in similarly general terms. For example, the Netherlands noted 
that it was “not just a public health crisis; it is also a social, humanitarian and political 
crisis…”67 Lithuania felt that, “The outbreak has turned into a complex emergency with 
significant political, social, economic, humanitarian and security dimensions,”68 while Jordan 
similarly noted that it “has become more than a general public health crisis and is now a 
multidimensional crisis at the political, social, economic, humanitarian and security levels.”69 
In more pointed remarks, the Australian Foreign Minister argued that, “The Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa … is much more than a health crisis. This outbreak has serious humanitarian, 
economic and social consequences – rising food prices, closed schools, lost livelihoods – and 
it threatens political stability.”70 One of the worst hit countries, Liberia, itself acknowledged 
“that the effects of this disease upon our society and our people are multidimensional.”71  
 
Economic effects 
The economic dimension of human security has increasingly been recognised,72 and a 
demonstrable connection between low levels of economic development and political and 
societal instability can be established.73 In this context, the economic effects of the Ebola 
                                                          
67 S/PV.7268, at pp.34-35. 
68 S/PV.7318, at p.18. 
69 S/PV.7268, at p.21. 
70 S/PV.7318, at p.9. 
71 S/PV.7318, at p.30. 
72 See, eg., Kahler, M., ‘Economic security in an era of globalization’, Pacific Review, 2004, v.1, n.4, pp.485-
502. 
73 Various indicators of states’ levels of development exist. However, the 2014 Human Development Index, 
contained in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report (New York: United Nations, 
2014) bears out the correlation between a state’s level of development and its general stability. Those states 
considered to have the lowest levels of development have invariably experienced internal conflict in the past 
two decades and include Liberia (175th of 187), Guinea-Bissau (177th) and Sierra Leone (183rd). Other notable 
hotspots featured in the index’s lower rankings include the DRC (186th), Central African Republic (185th) Cote 
d’Ivoire (171st), and Afghanistan (169th). See also Kim, N & Conceicao, P., ‘The Economic Crisis, Violent 
Conflict, and Human Development’, International Journal of Peace Studies, 2010, v.15, n.1, pp.29-43. 
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outbreak have been cited on numerous occasions.74 For example, the World Bank noted the 
impact on economic growth, suggesting that in a worst case scenario, Liberia’s annual 
economic growth could decline from 6.8% to -4.9%. Inflation was also a side effect.75  
The states directly affected by the Ebola outbreak themselves emphasised the devastating 
economic consequences with which they were faced. Liberia noted explicitly the relationship 
between poor economic conditions and conflict. As a society still seeking to create stability 
after a recent prolonged civil war, its UN representative argued that “Even before the 
outbreak, we were grappling with herculean challenges. They include finding productive 
employment for a significant number of our people – especially the youth, some of whom are 
ex-combatants – strengthening the rule of law and implementing measures for security sector 
reform…The Ebola outbreak has distracted our attention from those national priorities.”76 
Similarly, Sierra Leone remarked that, “we have made tremendous progress in rebuilding the 
economy and the lives of those who suffered during the war…It is a sad story that it is 
reversing all our gains and, more particularly, if we are not careful, that has strong global 
systemic challenges. If we do not act fast, it will challenge our human capacities.”77 Guinea 
noted, “Ebola is hampering economic activity and affecting all sectors, particularly 
transportation, trade, tourism and agriculture. That could result in a decline in the gross 
domestic product by about 2.5 per cent, suddenly undermining all of the development efforts 
and strategies undertaken by our three countries.”78  
The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs also spelled out the harsh economic 
repercussions for the most affected countries: “In the most-affected countries – Guinea, 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone – the implementation of critical Government programmes has 
slowed considerably, as national authorities have been forced to refocus their energies and 
resources on stopping, treating and preventing the spread of the Ebola outbreak…Ebola is 
significantly disrupting the economic sustainability of those countries, with dire 
consequences for the delivery of essential State services…There are also concerns about the 
continuity of critical projects focused on building peace and ensuring sustainable stability in 
three countries. Moreover, the adverse consequences of isolation and stigmatization on peace 
and security in the affected countries should not be underestimated.”79 
 
Human security 
As the Security Council’s collective security agenda has moved beyond the identification of 
state-centric threats to concern itself more with addressing threats to human security, most 
recent determinations by the Council of the existence of a threat to the peace have concerned 
situations involving major humanitarian crises. The harmful effects of such crises on the 
welfare and security of human beings are undeniably capable of posing threats to the peace in 
accordance with understandings of human security, and/or can be consequences of more 
specific – and traditional – threats to the peace, for example incidences of armed conflict.80 
That the Ebola outbreak represented a severe humanitarian crisis was explicitly recognised by 
the Security Council in resolution 2177 and concern for the individual well-being of those 
infected by – or at risk of being infected by – the Ebola virus is in line with the Council’s 
increased emphasis upon human security in the discharge of its chapter VII functions.  
Humanitarian considerations extended beyond the individual suffering of those infected by 
                                                          
79 UN Doc. S/PV.7279, at p.7. 
80 See further Wilson, G., ‘The United Nations Security Council and Refugee Flows as ‘Threats to the Peace’’, 
in Islam, R & Bhuiyan, J.H (eds.), An Introduction to International Refugee Law (Leiden & Boston: Martinus 
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Ebola to the ability of public health systems within affected states to tackle the outbreak, the 
resulting economic consequences for those systems, and the availability of adequate food 
supplies resulting from the general economic disruption caused by the outbreak in West 
Africa. This latter point was specifically made by the African Union’s representative at 
Security Council discussions, who argued that, “Traders, farmers and health officials can no 
longer go about their daily business without fear of the unknown… critical is the impact on 
cross-border trade and food security as people are unable to trade and work their fields, 
leading to a rise in food prices.”81 The Netherlands went so far as suggesting that such was 
the gravity of the situation that,” if we do not act now, people not dying of Ebola may die of 
starvation.”82 
 
Spill-over effects 
A commonly advanced criticism of collective security, grounded in realist perspectives upon 
international relations, has been that states will not be prepared to participate in collective 
efforts to address threats arising elsewhere unless their own national self-interests are in some 
way affected.83 Although this criticism is perhaps more relevant in the context of conflict 
situations requiring a military response, where situations of international concern produce 
effects which spread beyond their original source it becomes easier for states further afield to 
recognise impacts upon their own interests. The logic of states participating within collective 
security arrangements as a means of removing threats posed to other states before they grow 
into threats which directly threaten them has long been recognised and can be understood by 
reference to the ‘domino theory’. This notion informed US foreign policy towards the 
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Communist bloc during the Cold War era, particularly in respect of its approach to the 
Korean and Vietnam wars, where the US’ priority was to prevent against the perceived likely 
spread of communism should South Korea or South Vietnam succumb to communist rule. 
Summarising the underlying theory, President Eisenhower stated that “you have a row of 
dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is a 
certainty that it will go over very quickly.”84 Although the potential spill-over effects of 
threats to international peace and security were conceived in military terms in that context, 
the principle underpinning the ‘domino theory’ is theoretically of relevance to any kind of 
threat to the peace. Beyond the categorisation of the core nature of the complex threat posed 
by the Ebola outbreak in essentially human and economic terms, the potential for its initial 
effects to spill over and threaten areas further away from its origins has been explicitly 
recognised. The nature of infectious diseases is such that their potential to spill-over beyond 
the source of their origin is a real danger. Alluding to this risk, President Barack Obama 
argued that, “If this epidemic is not stopped, this disease could cause a humanitarian 
catastrophe across the region.”85 Similarly, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that, 
“The suffering and spill-over effects in the region and beyond demand the attention of the 
entire world. Ebola matters to us all.”86 The head of the WHO encouraged the international 
community to “remember that people crisscross West Africa’s porous borders all the time. 
Other countries will have to deal in the same aggressive way with imported cases.”87 A 
number of states also referred to the potential spill-over effects of the Ebola outbreak, for 
                                                          
84 Response to question in Press Conference, 1954, available at 
http://www.nv.cc.va.us/home/nvsageh/Hist122/Part4/IkeDomino.htm.  
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example the Netherlands noting that it had “the potential to destabilize entire countries and 
regions, compromising national, regional and international security.”88 
 
The collective nature of the threat 
Related to the spill-over potential of the threat posed by the Ebola outbreak, the international 
community went to some lengths to emphasise the collective nature of the threat and its 
shared stake in responding effectively to it. The very cornerstone of the concept of collective 
security is a shared acceptance of the ideal of the “indivisibility of peace”, the belief that the 
security of each state is tied to that of all other states.89 The collective security concept “is 
based on the assumption that all victims are equally important.”90 States must abandon 
narrow, short-term perceptions of their security needs grounded in self-interest. Instead, 
actions or occurrences which threaten the security of anyone anywhere must be tackled 
through collective means. The system of collective security established by the UN Charter 
has undoubtedly come in for most criticism when perceptions have arisen that its members 
have failed to demonstrate adequate concern for situations threatening the security of states 
and populations in perhaps far removed places, a most obvious example being the perceived 
failure of the international community to act to prevent the genocide which ravaged Rwanda 
during 1994.91 Where threats to the peace arise from situations of a humanitarian nature 
unaccompanied by armed conflict, however, the dangers which may discourage action on the 
part of other states are largely absent. This ought to more readily facilitate collective efforts 
in response on the part of the international community. While in recognising the potential 
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spill-over effects of the Ebola outbreak the international community has acknowledged the 
security threat it poses beyond the area of its primary concentration, it has arguably gone 
further in emphasising strongly the collective stake of the international community in 
addressing its causes and consequences. A proclaimed strength of collective security is it 
promotion of cooperation among states,92 and resolution 2177 itself noted that the “control of 
outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires…national, regional and international 
collaboration and…stressing the crucial and immediate need for a coordinated international 
response.” Member states were called upon “to provide urgent resources and assistance.”93 In 
no uncertain terms, President Obama proclaimed that “in an era where regional crises can 
quickly become global threats, stopping Ebola is in the interest of all of us.”94 In welcoming 
the US’ decision to contribute 3,000 troops to relief efforts, Ban Ki Moon suggested that, “No 
single government can manage the crisis on its own,”95 and one of the most severely affected 
states, Sierra Leone, underlined the collective international interest in tackling the Ebola 
outbreak when stating that, “It is…quite clear that an investment in the fight in the epicentre, 
West Africa, is an investment in our collective health and security.”96 The “indivisibility of 
peace” seemed central to pronouncements upon the nature of the threat posed by the Ebola 
outbreak in a manner not often noted in international discourse in respect of many previously 
recognised threats to the peace. 
 
Effects on post-conflict peacebuilding 
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The nature of complex situations posing threats to international peace and security is such 
that the cause or effect of one threat can rapidly transform into or impact upon other threats. 
The susceptibility of post-conflict states to renewed outbreaks of violence, and the 
contribution of socio-economic circumstances to this danger, has been well documented.97 A 
major point of concern in relation to those countries of West Africa most severely affected by 
the Ebola outbreak, in particular Liberia and Sierra Leone, is that these are states which have 
suffered from the catastrophic effects of internal conflict in recent years,98 and remain in the 
relatively early stages of peacebuilding processes designed to strengthen their recently 
obtained peace.99 Defined as “measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into 
conflict…and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development,”100 
peacebuilding processes’ central aims include reducing the risk of resumption of conflict.101 
The destabilizing socio-economic consequences of the Ebola outbreak, identified above, have 
the potential to undermine such peacebuilding processes and create an environment 
conducive to the kinds of pressures which ignite unrest, and subsequently armed conflict. 
Such concerns featured heavily in the Security Council’s debates over the Ebola epidemic, in 
which its destabilising effects were readily acknowledged. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon 
expressed the view that “The situation is especially tragic given the remarkable strides that 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone have made in putting conflict behind them.”102 The African Union’ 
representative believed that the situation arising in the region was “even more difficult for 
post-conflict countries on a serious course of reintegration, rehabilitation and rebuilding of 
their social fabric.”103 Several states referred expressly to the dangers posed by the 
consequences of the Ebola outbreak for the recently found peace in the affected states. Chile 
detailed the danger in some detail, noting that, “The epidemic has been undermining the 
social and economic stability of those countries, which are emerging from conflict, at a time 
when they have been pushing ahead with a determination in their respective peacebuilding 
processes…whenever there is a genuine threat of any type or origin to the stability, security 
and peace in an area or region that is in the process of building peace and supported by 
United Nations missions, the Council…must adopt the necessary decisions that will ensure 
the conditions needed in order for those affected countries to adopt and implement the 
technical measures and specific policies they need to tackle the emergency.”104 In a similar 
vein, Lithuania expressed concern that the Ebola outbreak “threatens to cancel the hard-won 
reconstruction and development gains of [the affected] countries.”105 Similarly, Russia 
suggested that “the further spread of the epidemic in African countries could carry the threat 
of destabilizing the situation and potentially be fraught with the danger of reigniting dormant 
conflicts and outbreaks of violence.”106 The affected countries themselves referred to their 
concern about a return to conflict. Liberia in particular articulated its fears in some detail, 
noting that “the Liberian people, with the unswerving support of [UNMIL] had been enjoying 
the dividends of the peace achieved in 2003, following 14 years of bloody civil conflict. 
During those years of calm, we succeeded in institutionalizing the democratic culture and had 
begun to take some strong steps, with the support of the United Nations and other 
                                                          
102 S/PV.7268, at p.2. 
103 S/PV.7268, at p.37. 
104 S/PV.7268, at p.22. See also S/PV.7318, at pp.24-5. 
105 S/PV.7318, at p.18. 
106 S/PV.7318, at p.22. 
22 
 
international partners, to address the legacy of socioeconomic devastation bequeathed by the 
protracted Liberian civil war.”107 It went on to add that it had made “valiant efforts to comply 
with regional protocols aimed at curbing the spread of small arms and light weapons and 
transnational crime” and that the current situation had “gravely undermined our ability to 
address them, with the attendant risk of adversely affecting peace and security in our country 
and region.”108 Similarly, Guinea referred to its own “considerable progress made in recent 
years…in terms of economic recovery, social cohesion and the democratization of political 
life risks being compromised by the far-reaching consequences of the Ebola virus disease.”109 
 
Responding to the threat 
 
As has been established, traditional notions of collective security envisaged military 
responses to military threats. However, as understandings of what can amount to threats to 
the peace have broadened, so too have the range of responses considered appropriate for 
addressing these threats. As Orakhelashvili notes, “the concept of collective security is broad, 
and can include in itself a variety of tasks such as conflict prevention, crisis management, 
peace-keeping, or peace enforcement, as required to enable the relevant institution to deal 
with threats as their gravity and magnitude require.”110 Under both the actual provisions of 
the UN Charter system and its implementation in practice, four main tools for responding to 
situations threatening international peace and security might be identified: pacific settlement 
or diplomacy, non-military sanctions, peacekeeping, and the application of military 
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enforcement measures.111 Prima facie, these tools appear more suited to the amelioration of 
disputes or conflicts than situations which have at their core public health crises. 
The peaceful settlement of disputes is expected to precede the adoption of any more robust 
collective security measures, the UN Charter explicitly requiring states to resolve their 
disputes peacefully.112 However, while traditional threats to the peace invariably emanated 
from disputes arising between states, increasingly they have come to stem from disputes 
within states or, as in the case of the Ebola outbreak, from situations which involve no 
dispute at all but a naturally occurring phenomenon which threatens human well-being. The 
techniques of pacific settlement identified in the UN Charter113 are, therefore, largely 
irrelevant to the amelioration of the Ebola epidemic. That said, in a broader sense diplomacy 
extends to the various interactions which take place between states, both through 
institutionalised fora and on an ad hoc basis. We have already referred to collective security’s 
proclaimed merits as an endeavour which permits the institutionalisation and promotion of 
interstate cooperation. Such interactions are clearly of potential benefit in promoting 
international cooperation upon responding to the Ebola outbreak. 
 
The core ‘teeth’ of the UN collective security system, namely non-military sanctions and 
military enforcement measures, are prima facie inappropriate mechanisms with which to 
address a threat to the peace of the nature of the Ebola outbreak. The effectiveness of military 
enforcement measures as a tool for tackling threats to the peace depends upon the existence 
of an identifiable target that is amenable to military coercion to remove it. As such, these are 
not obviously suited to tackling the Ebola outbreak, it not having been connected with any 
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actual, as opposed to potential, resulting outbreak of violence or other situation which may be 
alleviated by external military intervention. 
Although adopted in response to a broad range of threats to the peace, non-military sanctions 
under Article 41 are predicated upon the theory that the imposition of restrictive measures 
against those actors responsible for the existence of such threats may exert coercion over 
them to such an extent that they change their conduct, leading to the removal of the threat 
posed. To date these have taken the form of trade sanctions, arms embargoes, diplomatic and 
travel restrictions, and financial sanctions.114 UN sanctions formed a central plank of the 
international response to conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990s and early 
2000s, and partially remain in respect of Liberia in support of peacebuilding processes.115 
Their continued effective enforcement is, arguably, reliant upon the maintenance of a degree 
of stability in the region, and as Chad noted in the Security Council, “Ebola weakens 
everything that was built in the post-conflict period in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and makes it 
difficult to implement Security Council sanctions for those countries.”116 This underlines the 
fact that separate threats to the peace can impact upon one another, and reinforces the concern 
expressed by several states in the Council regarding the effects of the Ebola outbreak for the 
peacebuilding processes in the affected states. 
However, non-military sanctions are largely irrelevant as far as addressing the causes or 
consequences of the Ebola outbreak is concerned. There are no actors responsible as such for 
the creation of the Ebola epidemic, against which traditional sanctions might exert pressure to 
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effect a change in behaviour. It is conceivable that in appropriate circumstances, some form 
of sanctions might be usefully employed to restrain the effects of the epidemic, for example 
the imposition of travel restrictions in affected regions in order to prevent the spread of the 
disease. Such steps would be akin to public health measures underwritten by the mandatory 
force of Security Council decision-making, albeit in practice the minimal impact of the virus 
outside of the affected region, and the public health measures voluntarily undertaken by states 
to safeguard against its further spread have sufficed in this respect. 
 
It is appropriate to make reference to peacekeeping as a tool of the UN collective security 
system in the context of discourse over the threat to the peace posed by the Ebola outbreak, 
for both practical and conceptual reasons. In the latter sense, just as incidents such as the 
Ebola outbreak can hardly have been within the contemplation of the UN’s founders when 
drafting the language of Article 39, nor was peacekeeping which receives no mention in the 
UN Charter. In the same way that Article 39 has been interpreted increasingly broadly to take 
account of changing conceptions of peace and security, peacekeeping originated and evolved 
in order to permit the UN to make a useful response to situations demanding international 
action in a geopolitical environment characterised by a deadlocked Security Council for four 
decades. Peacekeeping is a remarkable creation of the United Nations era. Initially involving 
the imposition of lightly armed forces to supervise ceasefire agreements with the consent of 
the parties concerned,117 through successive generations UN peacekeeping has evolved as 
operations have undertaken a broad range of functions including the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to civilians during conflict and assisting the implementation of peace processes and 
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peacebuilding measures.118 UN peacekeeping operations had already been utilised as part of 
peacebuilding processes within Liberia119 and Sierra Leone,120 and a role for them in tackling 
the Ebola outbreak was quickly identified, Australia suggesting that, “[UN] peacekeeping 
missions, in particular…UNMIL, can also support efforts to combat the outbreak, as far as 
their capacities and mandates allow. We know that peacekeepers cannot be transformed into 
front-line health care workers, but as UNMIL is demonstrating, they can play a crucial role to 
communicate Ebola preventive measures to the public, and importantly, to dispel fear and 
misinformation.”121 Certainly, the broad functions undertaken by peacekeeping operations – 
which have increasingly included the provision of support for the delivery of humanitarian 
aid – would appear prima facie to complement some of the initiatives required to respond to 
the Ebola outbreak. Indeed, the Security Council in an earlier discussion on the HIV/Aids 
virus had recognized the role which peacekeeping operations could play in contributing 
towards collective efforts to tackle the spread of that disease,122  including the incorporation 
of HIV awareness within their mandates, outreach projects for vulnerable groups, and action 
to address conflict-related sexual violence.123  
An interesting development in response to the Ebola outbreak was the creation of 
UNMEER,124 a mission which arguably represents a hybrid peacekeeping/public health 
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operation.125 Described as “unique in many ways…the first emergency health mission…the 
first United Nations system-wide mission…a crisis-management mission,”126 UNMEER’s 
work has included overseeing safe burial of victims of Ebola, case identification and 
isolation, and treatment of those affected. It combines obvious public health functions 
performed by medical professionals, for example treatment, with more practical functions 
which peacekeepers are suited to perform, such as overseeing safe burials. The creation of 
UNMEER represents a yet further step in the evolution of the tools of the UN collective 
security system to respond to new challenges which arise from a broadened conception of 
collective security, and builds upon previous developments in which the purposes of 
peacekeeping – and strategies employed by it – were expanded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The international discourse and response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 provides 
us with a classic study in the evolution of the collective security concept within the practice 
of the United Nations. While in some respects evidencing its own unique features, the 
conceptualisation of the Ebola outbreak as a threat to the peace and the subsequent 
international response essentially builds upon an ongoing process through which the concept 
of collective security continues to be interpreted, taking account of developments in 
perceptions as to the nature of international peace and security threats. While the international 
community clearly attached significance to a number of key characteristics of the threat 
posed by the Ebola outbreak, the centrality of the concept of human security to the practice of 
collective security within the UN system was undoubtedly reinforced.  
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 However, while in one sense collective security is in a constant state of flux in terms of its 
practical ambit, it is also possible to identify a certain degree of constancy in the theoretical 
notion of collective security which is arguably traceable to its first inception within the UN 
system. This is borne out by the content of the Security Council’s discussion of the Ebola 
outbreak as a threat to the peace, with a number of the key features identified as central to the 
nature of the threat posed – in particular states’ collective stake in addressing the situation 
and its potential to spill-over – reflective of long established theoretical understandings of 
collective security’s core tenets and requirements. 
An important point to be noted from consideration of the Ebola outbreak as a threat to the 
peace concerns the mechanisms traditionally provided by the UN collective security system 
for responding to such threats. These were created largely with threats arising between states, 
and certainly situations taking the form of disputes or conflicts, in mind. As such they are ill-
suited for addressing naturally occurring phenomena, be these public health crises or natural 
disasters, and the international community must be prepared to give consideration to new 
techniques for addressing threats to the peace taking these forms. In this respect, the 
developments witnessed in the creation of UNMEER, which blends functions traditionally 
associated with some peacekeeping operations with strategies of public health actions, are 
encouraging. 
